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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Sandra Connelly appeals the dismissal of the 
employment discrimination claims she brought against her 
former employer, Lane Construction Corporation (“Lane”).  
We disagree with the District Court’s assessment that 
Connelly failed to plead plausible claims and, accordingly, 
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will vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual History1  
 
 Lane is a construction company operating in 20 states.  
In May 2006, it hired Sandra Connelly as a union truck driver 
at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania facility, and she worked during 
construction seasons – normally from March or April until 
October or November of each year – until near the close of 
the season in October 2010.  During Connelly’s tenure with 
the company, Lane employed seven union truck drivers at 
that location.  Connelly ranked fifth in seniority and was the 
only woman.  Since October 2010, Lane has employed no 
female truck drivers at its Pittsburgh facility.   
 
 Sometime after May 2007, and allegedly because 
Connelly had ended a romance with a man who also worked 
at Lane, her male co-workers began “curs[ing] at Connelly 
and belittl[ing] her on a daily basis.”  (App. 29.)  Some male 
drivers refused to speak directly to her.  In the summer of 
2007, another Lane employee told Connelly that Connelly’s 
former boyfriend, truck driver Mark Nogy, was making 
“increasingly frequent and disparaging” comments about her.  
(App. 29.)  The employee went on to say that he had 
                                              
1 Because the District Court addressed Connelly’s 
Amended Complaint upon a motion to dismiss, we recount 
the facts as alleged in that pleading and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Connelly.  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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complained about Nogy’s behavior to Charlie Ames, a Lane 
executive.  Connelly herself told several supervisors at Lane 
about the hostile treatment she was experiencing.  She called 
the company’s Connecticut headquarters and, a day later, 
Ames and another Lane executive met with her to discuss the 
harassment problem.  Following the meeting, Lane suspended 
Nogy for three days but did not discipline or warn any other 
Lane employees, who continued to harass and disparage 
Connelly.     
 
 In early 2009, Connelly learned that Lane employees 
could make job-related complaints through the company’s 
“Ethics Line,” which she called multiple times to report 
further harassment from Nogy, to make complaints about her 
male co-workers drinking on the job, and to report 
“discriminatory treatment due to her gender and her previous 
complaints about the hostile work environment.”  (App. 31.)   
 
 In or around May 2010, Lane foreman George 
Manning made an unwanted physical advance to Connelly, 
coming close to her and saying, “[O]ne day I’m going to kiss 
you.”  (App. 31.)  Connelly backed away and said “No,” and 
she reported the incident to the Ethics Line a few days later.  
(App. 31.)  She also reported the incident to supervisor 
Jeremy Hostetler, requesting that he transfer her to another 
work site because she was now uncomfortable working with 
Manning.  Hostetler expressed disbelief that Manning would 
“do something like that.”  (App. 32.)  Although Hostetler told 
Connelly that he wanted to meet with her and Manning 
together, no such meeting occurred.  After Connelly again 
called the Ethics Line about the situation, Hostetler agreed to 
transfer her to another job site, although it appears that 
Connelly continued to work from Lane’s Pittsburgh facility.  
 5 
 
Connelly’s relationship with both her supervisors and her 
male co-workers became “increasingly strained” throughout 
2010, during which time she made numerous complaints to 
the Ethics Line and to local management at the Pittsburgh 
facility.  (App. 32.)   
 
 In October 2010, Lane supervisor Jerry Schmittein 
became “incensed” at Connelly when she refused to drive a 
truck that had a flat tire and steering problems.  (App. 32.)  
Schmittein “persisted in berating Connelly,” despite her 
explanation that she could not safely operate the truck.  (App. 
32.)  Connelly contacted Ames, who instructed her to leave 
the job site.  A short time later, and despite her seniority, 
Connelly was laid off before the end of the construction 
season and before any of the other union truck drivers.  Lane 
has never recalled her to work.   
 
 Lane did, however, recall Connelly’s male truck driver 
co-workers in 2011, and it continues to employ them.  In 
April or May of 2011, after Connelly saw several of her co-
workers working at a job site, she repeatedly telephoned 
Ames to ask why she had not been recalled.  Ames cited the 
bad economy and told her that no work was available.  In one 
conversation, Ames told her that he would recall her if Lane 
“got more work.” (App. 33.) 
 
 Connelly had observed that all six of her male truck 
driver co-workers were working for Lane, so she called Ames 
and asked why union drivers with less seniority than her had 
been recalled before she was.  In Connelly’s experience, 
between 2006 and 2010, Lane had always recalled truck 
drivers in order of seniority.  Ames told Connelly that the 
truck driver with the least seniority had been permitted to 
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return to work as a general laborer because “he needed to 
work.”  (App. 33.)  Lane had not offered any such 
accommodation to Connelly.  Ames also explained that the 
other driver with less seniority than Connelly had been 
recalled to operate what was known as the “tack” truck 
because Connelly did not have the requisite training to 
operate that type of vehicle.  (App. 33.)  Connelly asked why 
the most senior driver, who was the primary tack truck 
operator, was no longer driving that truck.  Ames answered 
that that driver was the “senior man – he can choose what he 
drives.”  (App. 33.)  However, Lane had not previously 
permitted truck drivers to choose their work assignment based 
on seniority, and the union’s collective bargaining agreement 
provided that “[d]rivers in accordance with their 
qualifications and seniority shall be offered the highest rate 
classification of work but cannot choose their equipment or 
work assignments.”  (App. 33.)  Connelly was qualified to 
operate – and routinely had operated – all of the trucks used 
by Lane other than the tack truck.   
 
 Connelly also observed non-union truck drivers 
working at Lane sites in the spring and summer of 2011.  In 
addition, she saw Lane employing rental trucks from other 
companies and using Lane laborers to drive trucks.  Prior to 
2011, Lane had only resorted to that when no Lane drivers 
were available, and never when a Lane driver was waiting to 
be recalled.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 On September 26, 2013, Connelly filed her original 
complaint in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging claims of gender-based 
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disparate treatment, sexual harassment, hostile work 
environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended 
(“Title VII”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 
P.S. § 951 et seq. (“PHRA”).  Lane responded by filing an 
answer along with a motion to partially dismiss the 
complaint.  The Court dismissed as time-barred all but the 
retaliation claim, which related to Lane’s failure to rehire 
Connelly in April 2011, but granted Connelly’s request to file 
an amended complaint.     
 
 Connelly then filed her Amended Complaint, alleging 
separate counts of disparate treatment and retaliation under 
both Title VII and the PHRA.  Lane promptly moved to 
dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and, after briefing, the District Court 
granted that motion.  The Court held that, with respect to her 
disparate treatment claims, Connelly had “failed to plead a 
sufficiently plausible inference that she was not rehired due to 
her gender.”  (App. 12.)  Similarly, the Court held that the 
Amended Complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to 
establish a plausible claim of retaliation.  It also denied 
Connelly’s request to file a second amended complaint.  The 
District Court thus dismissed all of Connelly’s claims with 
prejudice.  She timely appealed.     
 
II. DISCUSSION2 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal 
claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and supplemental 
jurisdiction over the related state law claims under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction over the final decision 
of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
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Connelly asserts two claims of error.  First, she says 
that the District Court erred in holding that her Amended 
Complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard set forth in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  Second, she argues 
that the District Court should have granted her leave to 
further amend the Amended Complaint.  Because we agree 
with her on the first point, we need not reach the second.3   
A. Standards for Pleading Sufficiency 
 
                                                                                                     
review the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to 
dismiss under a plenary standard.  Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  We are 
“required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and 
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after 
construing them in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant.”  Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 
153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  However, as more fully described herein, we 
disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a 
cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.  
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
3 Connelly only sought a curative amendment if the 
District Court decided to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  In that event, she asked for leave to 
“bolster the factual allegations related to her retaliation and 
disparate treatment claims.”  (App. 14.)  Because we 
conclude that Connelly’s pleadings were sufficient to survive 
the motion to dismiss, no curative amendment is necessary. 
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 A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for 
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  
But detailed pleading is not generally required.  The Rules 
demand “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give 
the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.’”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  “A claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.; see also 
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Although the plausibility standard “does not 
impose a probability requirement,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 
it does require a pleading to show “more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678.  A complaint that pleads facts “merely consistent 
with a defendant’s liability … stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”  Id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense.”  Id. at 679.   
 
 Under the pleading regime established by Twombly 
and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint 
must take three steps.4  First, it must “tak[e] note of the 
                                              
4 Although Ashcroft v. Iqbal described the process as a 
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elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 675.  Second, it should identify allegations that, 
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled 
to the assumption of truth.”  Id. at 679.  See also Burtch v. 
Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.” (citation and editorial 
marks omitted)).  Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded 
factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity 
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
 
B. The Elements Necessary to State a Claim 
 
 We thus begin by taking note of the elements Connelly 
must plead to state her claims.  With respect to her disparate 
treatment claim, Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment 
practice for an employer … to discriminate against any 
individual …, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
See also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92-93 
(2003).  In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to further 
specify that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for 
                                                                                                     
“two-pronged approach,” 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), the 
Supreme Court noted the elements of the pertinent claim 
before proceeding with that approach, id. at 675-79.  Thus, 
we have described the process as a three-step approach.  
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citing Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130). 
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any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).  In Watson 
v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, we 
interpreted that amendment to apply only to the category of 
discrimination cases that involve a “mixed-motive.”  207 F.3d 
207, 214-20 (3d Cir. 2000).  Generally speaking, in a “mixed-
motive” case a plaintiff claims that an employment decision 
was based on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.  Such 
cases are in contrast to so-called “pretext” cases, in which a 
plaintiff claims that an employer’s stated justification for an 
employment decision is false. 
 
 A Title VII plaintiff may make a claim for 
discrimination “under either the pretext theory set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green[, 411 U.S. 792, (1973)], 
or the mixed-motive theory set forth in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins[, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)], under which a plaintiff may 
show that an employment decision was made based on both 
legitimate and illegitimate reasons.”5  Makky v. Chertoff, 541 
                                              
5 An employee proceeding under the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext framework bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case by showing: (1) that she was a 
member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the 
job, and (3) another person, not in the protected class, was 
treated more favorably.  See Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock 
Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 
2006).  If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer to establish a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.  Id.  If 
the employer provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to 
the employee to show that the proffered reason was mere 
pretext for actual discrimination.  Id.  Notwithstanding this 
 12 
 
F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).  As we recognized in Watson, 
the “pretext” and “mixed-motive” labels can be misleading 
because, even in a case that does not qualify for a burden-
shifting instruction under Price Waterhouse, the employer’s 
challenged conduct may nevertheless result from two or more 
motives, and the plaintiff “need not necessarily show ‘pretext’ 
but may prevail simply by showing, through direct or 
circumstantial evidence, that the challenged action resulted 
from discrimination.”  207 F.3d at 214 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted).  Under either theory of discrimination, the 
plaintiff must establish that her protected status was a factor 
in the employer’s challenged action.  The difference is in the 
                                                                                                     
burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff who produces “direct 
evidence” of discrimination may proceed under the mixed-
motive framework of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.  490 U.S. 
228, 276 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  As we explained 
in Armbruster v. Unisys Corp.: 
 
[I]n the Price Waterhouse framework … the 
evidence the plaintiff produces is so revealing 
of discriminatory animus that it is not necessary 
to rely on any presumption from the prima facie 
case to shift the burden of production.  Both the 
burden of production and the risk of non-
persuasion are shifted to the defendant who … 
must persuade the factfinder that even if 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the 
adverse employment decision, it would have 
made the same employment decision regardless 
of its discriminatory animus. 
32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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degree of causation that must be shown: in a “mixed-motive” 
case, the plaintiff must ultimately prove that her protected 
status was a “motivating” factor, whereas in a non-mixed-
motive or “pretext” case, the plaintiff must ultimately prove 
that her status was a “determinative” factor.  See id. at 214-20 
(summarizing the distinction in standards of causation that 
apply to “pretext” and “mixed-motive” cases and concluding 
that the 1991 amendment to Title VII did not alter that 
distinction). 
 
 Connelly’s Amended Complaint does not specify 
whether she intends to proceed under a “mixed-motive” or a 
“pretext” theory, and understandably so.  The distinction 
between those two types of cases “lies in the kind of proof the 
employee produces on the issue of [the employer’s] bias,” 
Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1097 
(3d Cir. 1995), and identifying the proof before there has 
been discovery would seem to put the cart before the horse.  
Indeed, we have said that, even at trial, an employee “may 
present his case under both theories,” provided that, prior to 
instructing the jury, the judge decides whether one or both 
theories applies.  Id. at 1098 (internal citation omitted); see 
also Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 
(8th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[w]hether a case is a pretext case 
or a mixed-motives case is a question for the court once all 
the evidence has been received”).  Thus, for purposes of 
noting the elements Connelly must plead to state a disparate 
treatment claim, we take it as given that she may advance 
either a mixed-motive or a pretext theory. 
 
 The District Court, however, incorrectly evaluated the 
Amended Complaint as if Connelly were confined to showing 
pretext.  Moreover, the Court’s analysis proceeded with a 
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point-by-point consideration of the elements of a prima facie 
case required under a pretext theory.  It is thus worth 
reiterating that, at least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a 
complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss.6  A prima facie case is “an 
evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement,” 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002), and 
hence is “not a proper measure of whether a complaint fails to 
state a claim.”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 
213 (3d Cir. 2009).  As we have previously noted about 
pleading in a context such as this, 
 
[a] determination whether a prima facie case 
has been made … is an evidentiary inquiry – it 
defines the quantum of proof [a] plaintiff must 
present to create a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination.  Even post-Twombly, it has been 
                                              
6 In Makky v. Chertoff, we held that the plaintiff could 
not avoid dismissal of his mixed-motive discrimination claim 
if there was “unchallenged objective evidence” that he did not 
possess the “baseline qualifications” to do his job, because 
such a plaintiff would inevitably fail to establish a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination after the pleading stage.  
541 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).  However, our analysis 
explicitly assumed the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings, 
id. at 214, and we limited our “necessarily narrow” holding to 
those rare mixed-motive cases in which the plaintiff’s lack of 
baseline qualifications is “capable of objective determination 
before discovery,” as when the job requires consideration of a 
license or similar prerequisite, id. at 215.  Thus, that opinion 
expressly recognized that the prima facie case is a separate 
inquiry that generally cannot occur until after discovery. 
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noted that a plaintiff is not required to establish 
the elements of a prima facie case … . 
Id. at 213 (citation omitted).  Instead of requiring a prima 
facie case, the post-Twombly pleading standard “‘simply calls 
for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element[s].”  
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
 
 Should her case progress beyond discovery, Connelly 
could ultimately prevail on her disparate treatment claim by 
proving that her status as a woman was either a “motivating” 
or “determinative” factor in Lane’s adverse employment 
action against her.  Therefore, at this early stage of the 
proceedings, it is enough for Connelly to allege sufficient 
facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
uncover proof of her claims. 
 
 For the same reasons, Connelly’s retaliation claim may 
survive Lane’s motion to dismiss if she pleads sufficient 
factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of the following elements: (1) 
she engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) the 
employer took adverse action against her; and (3) a causal 
link exists between her protected conduct and the employer’s 
adverse action.  Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 
194, 201 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
C. Excluding Conclusory Allegations  
 
 At the second step in our pleading analysis, we 
identify those allegations that, being merely conclusory, are 
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not entitled to the presumption of truth.  Twombly and Iqbal 
distinguish between legal conclusions, which are discounted 
in the analysis, and allegations of historical fact, which are 
assumed to be true even if “unrealistic or nonsensical,” 
“chimerical,” or “extravagantly fanciful.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
681.  Put another way, Twombly and Iqbal expressly declined 
to exclude even outlandish allegations from a presumption of 
truth except to the extent they resembled a “formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a … claim” or other legal 
conclusion.7  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 
2015) (concluding that allegations that were “neither legal 
assertions nor conclusory statements reciting the elements of 
a cause of action” were “entitled to a presumption of truth” 
under Iqbal).  Perhaps “some allegations, while not stating 
ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or 
speculative that they fail to cross the line between the 
conclusory and the factual,” but the clearest indication that an 
allegation is conclusory and unworthy of weight in analyzing 
the sufficiency of a complaint is that it embodies a legal 
point.  Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 
(1st Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
                                              
7 The Court in Iqbal clarified that it was only the 
conclusory nature of certain allegations – that is, their mere 
recitation of formulaic legal elements – that rendered them 
excludable: “[W]e do not reject these bald allegations on the 
ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. … It is the 
conclusory nature of [the] allegations, rather than their 
extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the 
presumption of truth.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 
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 Although the District Court considered the Amended 
Complaint to be “extremely vague and conclusory,” it did not 
specifically identify any allegations that, being mere legal 
conclusions, should have been discounted.  (App. 10.)  In our 
plenary review of the motion to dismiss, we consider the 
following allegations in the Amended Complaint to be 
disentitled to any presumption of truth:  (1) that Connelly’s 
supervisors at Lane “subjected her to disparate treatment 
based on her gender and retaliation for making complaints 
about discrimination and sexual harassment” (App. 26); (2) 
that Lane, “[b]y subjecting Connelly to discrimination based 
on her gender and retaliation,” violated Title VII and the 
PHRA (App. 26-27); (3) that Connelly was an “employee” of 
Lane “within the meaning of Title VII and the PHRA” (App. 
27); (4) that “[a]t all times relevant to this case, [Lane] was an 
‘employer’ within the meaning of Title VII and the PHRA” 
(App. 27); and (5) that “Connelly has exhausted her federal 
and state administrative remedies.”  (App. 36).  All of these 
allegations paraphrase in one way or another the pertinent 
statutory language or elements of the claims in question.  To 
the extent that Connelly’s allegation that she “was sexually 
harassed” by Manning states a legal conclusion, that is also 
excluded, although her factual allegations describing 
Manning’s behavior and her reaction to him, along with her 
allegation that his threatened physical contact was 
“unwanted,” are accepted as true.  (App. 31.) 
 
D. Construing the Historical Facts in the 
 Plaintiff’s Favor 
 
 Even after Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint’s 
allegations of historical fact continue to enjoy a highly 
favorable standard of review at the motion-to-dismiss stage of 
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proceedings.  See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (noting that 
Twombly “leaves intact” the pleading standard under which 
“detailed factual allegations” are not required).  Although a 
reviewing court now affirmatively disregards a pleading’s 
legal conclusions, it must still – as we have already 
emphasized – assume all remaining factual allegations to be 
true, construe those truths in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and then draw all reasonable inferences from them.  
Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2014); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (holding 
that Twombly did not “undermine [the] principle” that all 
reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the plaintiff, 
and reaffirming that “the facts alleged must be taken as true 
and a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it 
appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will 
ultimately prevail on the merits”). 
 
1. The Disparate Treatment Claim 
 
 With respect to Connelly’s disparate treatment claim,8 
the Amended Complaint set forth sufficient factual 
allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
would reveal evidence that Connelly was a member of a 
                                              
8 While Connelly advances a disparate treatment claim 
under both Title VII and the PHRA, we refer to those claims 
in the singular, as they are governed by essentially the same 
legal standards.  See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., 
Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The analysis 
required for adjudicating [plaintiff’s discrimination] claim 
under PHRA is identical to a Title VII inquiry, and we 
therefore do not need to separately address her claim under 
the PHRA.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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protected class and that she suffered an adverse employment 
action when Lane did not rehire her in 2011.  More 
specifically, Connelly has alleged that (i) during her tenure at 
Lane, she was the only female truck driver at the Pittsburgh 
facility; (ii) she was qualified to drive all but one of Lane’s 
trucks; (iii) Lane failed to rehire her at the start of the 2011 
construction season, despite recalling the six other union 
truck-drivers – all male, and two with less union seniority 
than Connelly; and (iv) since failing to rehire Connelly, Lane 
has employed no other female truck drivers.  Once accepted 
as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, those allegations raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence that Connelly’s protected 
status as a woman played either a motivating or determinative 
factor in Lane’s decision not to rehire her.  That is enough for 
Connelly’s disparate treatment claim to survive a motion to 
dismiss.  Cf. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211-12 (“Although [the] 
complaint is not as rich with detail as some might prefer, it 
need only set forth sufficient facts to support plausible 
claims.”).   
 
 Connelly has also alleged that Lane apparently 
deviated from its own past hiring norms and work 
assignments during the 2011 construction season by 
employing rental trucks and allowing a less senior driver to 
operate the tack truck.  Once accepted as true and construed 
in the light most favorable to Connelly, those factual 
allegations would also permit the reasonable inference that 
Lane’s proffered explanation that it failed to rehire Connelly 
for lack of work was pretextual.  But, to be clear, at this stage 
Connelly is not obliged to choose whether she is proceeding 
under a mixed-motive or pretext theory, nor is she required to 
establish a prima facie case, much less to engage in the sort of 
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burden-shifting rebuttal that McDonnell Douglas requires at a 
later stage in the proceedings.  It suffices for her to plead facts 
that, construed in her favor, state a claim of discrimination 
that is “plausible on its face.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  She has done that. 
 
2. The Retaliation Claim 
 
 Turning to the elements of Connelly’s retaliation 
claim, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, taken as 
true, also raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence both that Connelly engaged in activity 
protected by Title VII and that Lane took an adverse 
employment action against her.9  To the latter point, Lane 
took an adverse employment action against Connelly when it 
failed to rehire her at the start of the 2011 construction 
season.  To the former, Connelly engaged in protected 
activity when she filed multiple complaints of sexual 
harassment – including and most obviously her May 2010 
complaint that Manning, a company foreman, had made 
unwanted physical advances toward her.10 
                                              
9 Again, although Connelly’s retaliation claims are 
advanced under both Title VII and the PHRA, we refer to 
those claims in the singular because the same framework for 
analyzing retaliation claims applies to both.  Cf. Krouse v. 
Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e 
analyze ADA retaliation claims under the same framework 
we employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.”). 
10 To be protected from retaliation under Title VII, the 
protected activity must relate to employment discrimination 
charges brought under that statute, implicating 
“discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
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 The District Court held that Connelly’s retaliation 
claim came short of plausibility by “fail[ing] to plead a causal 
connection between the failure to rehire Connelly in April 
2011 and her alleged protected activity.”  (App. 13.)  In 
pertinent part, the District Court concluded that there was “no 
temporal proximity (as pled, her last report of sexual 
harassment was in May 2010, almost a year prior to the 
failure to rehire her), and no pattern of antagonism by Lane 
management.”  (App. 13.) 
 
 Given the seasonal character of Connelly’s work, we 
question the District Court’s conclusion about temporal 
proximity.  Because Lane only hired Connelly during 
construction seasons, traditionally laying workers off in 
October or November and then rehiring them in March or 
April of the following year, it may be that a retaliatory 
decision to not rehire her would not become apparent until 
after the off-season that ran from October 2010 to March 
2011.11 
                                                                                                     
national origin.”  Slagle v. Cty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 268 
(3d Cir. 2006).  For that reason, we agree with the District 
Court that Connelly’s other complaints, to the extent they 
implicated only safety issues, were not protected activity for 
purposes of her retaliation claim.   
11 As we have already stated, no showing of proof is 
necessary at this stage of the proceedings, but even if the 
record ultimately produced no evidence of temporal 
proximity suggestive of retaliation, that would not necessarily 
be fatal to Connelly’s claim.  See Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The mere passage 
of time is not legally conclusive proof against retaliation.”); 
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 In any case, the question of temporal proximity does 
not render Connelly’s retaliation claim facially implausible.  
Connelly alleged that, after she complained of Manning’s 
unwanted advances, and after overcoming another 
supervisor’s resistance to her grievance by complaining 
                                                                                                     
Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (“It is important to emphasize that it is causation, 
not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of plaintiff’s 
prima facie case, and temporal proximity merely provides an 
evidentiary basis from which an inference can be drawn.”). 
Where the time between the protected activity 
and adverse action is not so close as to be 
unusually suggestive of a causal connection 
standing alone, courts may look to the 
intervening period for demonstrative proof, 
such as actual antagonistic conduct or animus 
against the employee, or other types of 
circumstantial evidence, such as inconsistent 
reasons given by the employer for terminating 
the employee or the employer’s treatment of 
other employees, that give rise to an inference 
of causation when considered as a whole. 
Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citations omitted and emphasis added).  Even at this 
stage, if one accepts as true all of Connelly’s factual 
allegations about her union seniority, Lane’s past hiring 
practices, the company’s traditional distribution of labor, and 
her personal observations of Lane’s 2011 workforce, one 
could reasonably draw the inference that Lane gave Connelly 
inconsistent and false reasons for declining to rehire her.   
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directly to the Ethics Line, her relationship with both her 
supervisors and male co-workers became “increasingly 
strained” throughout the year.  (App. 32.)  Thus, Connelly has 
alleged facts that could support a reasonable inference of a 
causal connection between her protected activity in May 2010 
and the gradual deterioration of her relationship with her 
employer until she was laid off in October 2010.   
 
 In finding no causal connection between Connelly’s 
protected acts and Lane’s failure to rehire her in 2011, the 
District Court noted that Lane continued to rehire Connelly 
for four consecutive years despite her many complaints, and 
even encouraged her to continue calling the Ethics Line.  
While we agree that those facts could be viewed as cutting 
against Connelly, that is not what the applicable standard of 
review allows at this point in the case.  We must adhere to the 
requirement that all alleged facts be construed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, which, if done, permits the 
view that gender discrimination was a motivating factor or 
determinative factor in the decision not to recall Connelly in 
2011.  Likewise, the fact that Lane continued to rehire 
Connelly for four years despite her complaints about co-
workers, but declined to rehire her at the first such 
opportunity after she complained of harassment by a 
supervisor, can be construed to support a reasonable inference 
of a causal connection between the protected act and the 
adverse employment action.   
 
 Therefore, even if one believed it “unlikely that the 
plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the 
merits,” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 563 n.8), it must still be said that Connelly – under a 
favorable standard of review – has raised a reasonable 
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inference that discovery will reveal evidence of the elements 
necessary to establish her claims. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 Because Connelly has alleged facially plausible claims 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, we will vacate the 
District Court’s Order dismissing the Amended Complaint 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.    
